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## **DREAMS ABOUT BYZANTIUM.**

### **Place of Civilization and Cultural Heritage of Byzantium in the Region of Central and Eastern Europe Border Zone**

In May, 1921 in Vilna Belarusian thinker Ignat Kanchevsky who took the pseudonym Ignat Abdziralovich finished his essay “Vechnyj put’ (Issledovanie belorusskogo mirooshchushchenija)” (“Eternal Path (Research of Belarusian World Perception)”. The specificity of the historical way and the problem of culture genesis of Belarusians and Ukrainians were defined by Abdziralovich through civilization division:

“If the Belarusian people did not create expressive culture it was because the people’s historical heritage had a big tragedy of the national spirit which was borne only by two or three European peoples: since the X century Belarus has been and still is a real battlefield of two directions of culture, namely, Aryan, the culture of the west and the east. The border of the two [centers] of influence, dividing Slavic peoples into two camps, passes through Belarus, Ukraine and is lost in the Balkan lands.”<sup>1</sup>

Abdziralovich believes that a ten-century “hesitation” proves that Belarusians, Ukrainians and the Balkan Slavs could not sincerely “join” either of the directions. He claims, “We neither became the people of the East nor accepted the culture of Western Europe. Because of this they began to call us dark, wild peoples”<sup>2</sup>

What is hidden behind these words of the text that turned into a cult text for Belarusian intellectuals at the end of the 1980 – 1990s? Is it hyperhistoricism with its biased attention to traumas of the past or search for adequacy? In any case, the starting plot here is the Byzantine heritage and its reception in the region that due to historical circumstances was called the Border zone by political scientists and culturologists.

### ***Problem of Cultural Influence/Dialogue in Border Zone***

Cultural border zone can be understood as the space of regular and long-term contacts of different cultures that leads to the emergence of new cultural forms. A similar process occurs through loans, creation of new preservation variants and conversion. It also happens so that intercultural contacts cannot have any effect.<sup>3</sup>

The latest research shows that the discredited concept “*influence*” should be replaced with the term “*dialogue*” as in a wide historical prospect the interaction of cultures is always dialogic. After the first stages with an alternating activity of the transferor and the acceptancee, the other becomes one’s own, being transformed and frequently radically changing the image.<sup>4</sup> The dialogue of cultures is accompanied by an increase in hostility of the acceptancee towards the one who dominates over him. There comes the stage of an acute struggle for spiritual independence. The moment when the one who kept accepting a stream of texts, suddenly changes the direction and becomes their active transmitter accompanied by a flash of national consciousness and the growth of animosity towards the participant of the dialogue who used to dominate before.<sup>5</sup> Then the periphery revolt against the centre of the cultural area takes place.

One of the typological features of the cultural dialogue is the asymmetry of dialogical partnership. Binarity and asymmetry are the obligatory laws of construction of a real semiotics system.<sup>6</sup> At the beginning of the dialogue the dominating party, choosing itself the central position in cultural space, imposes the periphery position on the receiver. This model is acquired by them, and they have to evaluate themselves in a similar way. However, when approaching the culmination moment, the “new” culture starts confirming its “antiquity” and applies for the central position in the cultural world.<sup>7</sup> It is also essential that when passing from the condition of the receiver into the position of the transmitter, culture should throw out a considerably bigger number of texts than it absorbed in the past and, besides, it begins to expand its influence space. Thus, the intrusion of external texts plays the role of the destabilizer and catalyst, activating the forces of local culture, but not substituting them.

It is even more so as the culture of the border zone is mainly defensive, internally focused on confrontation, sometimes even aggressive.<sup>8</sup> At the same time the border zone is also the space for competition between cultures, and not just the territory of “power: confrontation. In this space there also exists a specific culture of “transitive” character.<sup>9</sup>

### ***Kiev as New Constantinople or New Jerusalem***

In the image-symbolical situation the meeting of Byzantium and Eastern Europe was very appreciable. Already in “Tale of Bygone Years” (“Russian Primary Chronicle”) there is an idea of the divine calling of Kiev, namely it is a question of the apocryphal story about the visit by apostle Andrey of Kiev heights and the prophecy, that “God’s grace will

shine on these mountains; a great city will be there and many churches will be erected”<sup>10</sup> Another classic declaration of the special Kiev status in the early chronicles are the words of prince Oleg said after his successful campaign against Ascold and Dir in 882: “This will be the Russian mother city”.<sup>11</sup> The majority of researchers find this metaphor to be a loan translation of the Greek μητρόπολις (metropolis) – “mother of cities”.<sup>12</sup> Kiev itself in many respects copied the centre of Eastern Christianity Constantinople as the city space of Kiev was formed following the image of Tsargrad, and stone construction was conducted in the imitation of the Byzantium capital. In Kiev there were gates similar to Constantinople Golden gates, the temple of St. Sofia, monasteries of St. George and St. Irina.<sup>13</sup>

However, Constantinople itself was built up “in the name of” Jerusalem and this allowed to underline the continuity of a new Christian capital to rescue the mankind, i.e. the role lost by “old” Jerusalem. Constantinople became the spiritual and secular center of the Universe as representatives of eastern Christianity understood it, namely, Constantinople was “New Jerusalem” and “the second Rome”. The structure of the Constantinople city space was also brought into accord with this idea. The most indicative examples include the construction of the Golden Gate – “in the name of” the Golden gates through which Christ (the Tsar of the world) drove into Jerusalem, and the temple of St. Sofia-God’s Wisdom – “in the name of” the main relic of ancient Jerusalem of the old Judaic Temple.<sup>14</sup>

Rus’ knew very well that Constantinople was New Jerusalem. This is proved by the coincidence of “plots with crosses”. Just like emperor Konstantin Veliky together with his mother Saint Elena brought a cross from Jerusalem duke Vladimir with his grandmother Olga brought a cross to Rus’. The christening of Russia was likened to the Empire conversion.<sup>15</sup> In this case the organisation of the Kiev city space “in the name of” Constantinople could also be perceived by contemporaries as the claim for the right to become a new capital of Lord chosen or Lord promised land if one is to use the language of the Bible; it is already a “Jerusalem” plot described very clearly in the Old Russian books.<sup>16</sup> For example, in “The Word about Law and Divine Grace” metropolite Illarion wrote about similarities between the construction of the Jerusalem temple and the Kiev Sofia cathedral<sup>17</sup>, while “Memory and Praise” by Jacob Mnih directly proclaimed, “What a wonder! Like the second Jerusalem Kiev appeared on the earth.”<sup>18</sup>

As researchers note, the perception of Kiev as a New Jerusalem, probably, existed until the moment when the concept “Moscow – the third Rome”<sup>19</sup> was finally formed. The latter is traditionally connected with the name of monk Filofej.<sup>20</sup> However, Filofej himself never called Moscow “the third Rome” (“there were two Romes, the third is standing, and there won’t be the fourth”).<sup>21</sup> One talks not about the capital, but about the kingdom. Moscow was named Rome only in the so-called “Kazan History”, written in the mid-sixties of the XVI century: “Here has appeared the capital and glorious Moscow, like the second Kiev, I will not be ashamed and I will not be guilty to say that its the third new great Rome that began to shine last summer like a great sun in the capital of our Russian land.”<sup>22</sup> For us this citation is important because it says that the author of “Kazan history” associates Moscow not only with the third Rome, but also with the second Kiev which is, actually, called the

New Rome and, hence, the New Jerusalem as for the inhabitants of Rus' these concepts were inseparably linked to each other.

Accordingly, it is possible to assume, that already in the 30s of the XI century the idea of Kiev as the New Jerusalem and the centre of rescue of Orthodox mankind started to be formed. The thought about "Byzantine heritage", not even developed yet at that moment, could have arisen quite long before the falling of Constantinople under the Turkish attack in 1453.<sup>23</sup>

The idea of "Kiev is the second Jerusalem" went through its rebirth at the beginning of the XVII century in connection with very specific circumstances, namely, the consecration in 1620 of the Kiev metropolite and the episcopate by Jerusalem patriarch Feofan. The consequence of this was intellectual enthusiasm and the dissemination among the educated circles of Kiev of the idea of close connections between Kiev and Jerusalem.<sup>24</sup>

However, Moscow masters as the importance of their city and principedom grew started to bend towards a reverse tendency, i.e., desacralization of Kiev. After the resettlement from Kiev to Moscow, Rus' metropolites, when visiting Kiev, every time took out valuable books and church utensils from there. This practice was criticized by the grand Lithuanian duke Vitautas who in 1415, aspiring to elect a Kiev metropolite aware of the situation and having power in the Great Duchy of Lithuania declared that Moscow metropolites "took away all church honor of Kiev metropole."<sup>25</sup> A real tragedy happened in 1482 when the grand duke of Moscow Ivan III used the help of Crimean khan Mengli-Girej. On September, 1st, 1482 the Crimean Tatars attacked Kiev and destroyed it almost completely. Many books and icons were burnt. As a sign of his allied obligations Mengli-Girej sent a gold chalice from St. Sofia profaned by Tatars to Ivan III; the fact that such a gift was accepted, shall be regarded as sacrilege.<sup>26</sup>

Actually, the attitude of the Moscow ruling circles towards Kiev was dual.<sup>27</sup> On the one hand, they wanted to expel this ancient city-symbol from public consciousness and minimize its spiritual authority. However, on the other hand, Moscow based its foreign policy program on the accentuation of the role of Kiev in the life of the Old Russian lands when, according to the grand duke of Moscow Ivan IV, "and Vilna, and Podolsk lands, and Halitia lands, and Volynsk lands all belonged to Kiev."<sup>28</sup> At the end of the XV – the beginning of the XVI century Moscow even managed to fix its claims on Kiev in its allied agreements with the emperors of the Sacred Roman Empire.<sup>29</sup>

Kiev was not less important from the point of view of claims of the Moscow dukes on the tsar title which was officially accepted by Ivan IV in 1547. The basis of these claims was the "Monomakh cap" legend. Shortly before 1480 when Moscow finally got rid of the power of Mongols, the grand duke Ivan III married Sofia Paleolog, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor. Thus, Moscow court acquired Byzantine greatness and ceremonial. The ideological base was supported with the legend that Emperor Constantine Monomakh granted signs of the imperial power and a crown to the Kiev duke Vladimir Monomakh. Then the crown presented became the regalia of Moscow grand dukes. As a result, post factum Kiev was given the imperial status, while Moscow was declared to be the Kiev heir-

ess and the successor of the imperial tradition. Besides, the acquisition of this status meant the formulation of the foreign policy program potentially allowing Moscow to lay claims to all territories which were managed by some Rurikovich. Already in the 1520s Pskov monk Filafej formulated the general outline of “the third Rome” concept which described the result of the mixture of secular and religious heritage.<sup>30</sup> However, the monarchs of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, for example, Sigismund August in 1548, had their own arguments as Kiev was a part of the GDL and “it was not decent for anyone to use the name and title of the Kiev kingdom, only his royal Worship could do it but not the grand duke of Moscow.”<sup>31</sup>

Modern Ukrainian researcher Olena Rusina supposes that the reaction to the discrepancy of Kiev heritage “privatisation” was, in essence, “compromise theory” according to which Moscow already incorporated the Kiev heritage, therefore, as a matter of fact, it was the second Kiev.<sup>32</sup> There are not many proofs of this theory, thus allowing Charles Galperin to say that it was not explicitly stated.<sup>33</sup> But as it becomes apparent from the quoted fragment of “Kazan history” and as O.Rusina notes, the “Moscow is the second Kiev” concept found its embodiment in the monuments of Russian thought in the XVI century. Actually, at that time in Moscow there co-existed two ideas: “Moscow is the second Kiev” and “Moscow is the third Rome”.

It lets us see that in order to preserve the role of the spiritual and political centre of Slavic Eastern Europe Kiev took up the symbolically-sacral functions of Constantinople, and through it of Jerusalem. The latter image concept (“Jerusalem”) only strengthened with the beginning of the new time (from the XVI century) while the ideological importance of Constantinople subordinated by Turks, grew considerably dull. However, (at first, the Moscow state), the emerging Russian empire did not need a symbolical competitor. Therefore, it became clear that the role of Kiev as New Constantinople should have been minimized a long time ago and then its being New Jerusalem that remained in people’s consciousness, though the internal gravitation towards “Kiev times” and “Kiev heritage” was still, nevertheless, experienced by Moscow ideologists thus exposing the duality of the Kiev role in a new imperial ideology.

### ***East and West in Ukrainian Perusal: “Byzantine Factor” of Ukrainian Historiography***

The counting of representations of modern Ukrainian academic thought regarding the reception of Byzantine heritage shall be started with the works of the Ukrainian historiography classic M. Hrushevsky. In his “History of Ukraine-Rus” M. Hrushevsky addressed the eternal problem of the countries in our region, namely the problem of choice, “In the first centuries of historical life Ukraine occupied a middle position between the influences of Eastern and Byzantine cultures which, however, itself was an alloy of antique and Eastern elements. In the other half of the X century Ukraine unconsciously turned from the East to Byzantium.”<sup>34</sup> However, M. Hrushevsky simultaneously asserted that it was



already Duke Vladimir who “consciously and vigorously” pushed Rus’ in the direction of Byzantium. According to the historian, Rus’ got under the cultural influence not of Western but Eastern Rome, i.e. Constantinople, and it was quite natural, for “Byzantium was close geographically, and its culture, both spiritual and material, was above this comparison; it is possible to say that it was a hot clear day, while a pale dawn ascended over Germany.”<sup>35</sup> Thus, Byzantine culture was closer due to its content as it acquired not only Eastern elements which Ukraine was familiar with directly, but also some Slavic elements. “It was unrealistic to expect that the western culture was to grow, and the Byzantine one was to lag behind.” Byzantium was both politically and culturally at the peak of its power and glory.

The Ukrainian historian emphasized the existence of various opinions regarding Ukraine’s “Byzantine turn”, “Current times evaluate the results of it differently: some believe that the turn to Byzantium, instead of to the West, represented great salvation, while to others it seemed to be fatal [event – *O.D.*] which prevailed then over the whole further destiny of Eastern Slavic culture.” The first opinion was, certainly, typical of Russian Slavophiles with the second one being more characteristic of Western culture supporters. Continuing his reasoning, M. Hrushevsky makes a very important conclusion, departing from manikheisky perception of history, “In reality, we do not see anything especially saving or fatal in this turn. It is clear that we did not receive any special benefits from it; but in itself this turn was not harmful. In any case, Byzantine culture itself was not worse for further cultural development than Roman-German culture.”<sup>36</sup>

Claiming that contemptuous opinions about “Byzantium orientation” became a vestige of science, Hrushevsky further addresses historical stereotypes, “If for Eastern Slavic peoples this Byzantine culture degenerated into Byzantium imitation then it is not culture that is guilty, but those circumstances which did not provide any possibility to acquire the Byzantine culture in all depth and completeness, with all its noblest features and then did not allow these positive feature lines to develop accordingly.”<sup>37</sup> Besides, the acceptance of the Byzantine culture did not at all mean any exclusive counteraction to western culture as throughout later centuries of its history Ukraine and especially its western part was getting ever more close to the European culture and Byzantine bases did not prevent it from acquiring certain elements of western civilization.

Nevertheless, M. Hrushevsky remained “geographical fatalist”: “The Ukrainian territory is guilty in many respects for its historical heritage that is rich in sacred, noble, even occasionally brilliant aspirations but at the same time doubtful because of its real content which the millennium of historical life transferred to modern generations.”<sup>38</sup>

Besides “historiosophic examination” “the Byzantine block” was used by M. Hrushevsky to profoundly analyze the questions of church organization, specifically the relations between the Russian church with the patriarch and the emperor as well as the reception of Byzantine law.

As a matter of fact, from the organizational point of view the land of the Kiev state made up (with a small exception) only one metropole, namely, “Russian”, which permanently depended on the Constantinople patriarch and was one of his metropolises. In spite

of the fact that this metropole surpassed in its sizes the territory of the patriarchy, its hierarchical position was absolutely low – at the beginning it occupied the sixtieth place in the Constantinople metropole, while later (in the XII–XIV centuries) it was the seventy first or seventy second, and almost completely depended on the patriarch. The patriarch himself, without any consultations with Russian dukes, chose the candidate for metropolitans, who was usually a Greek or, as a last resort, an Hellenized Byzantine, then conducted the ceremony of ordination and sent him to Rus' without any preliminary dealings with governors and bishops of Rus'.

It is important to keep in mind that in the consciousness of Byzantines there was a connection between this church-hierarchical practice and their opinion that the Byzantine emperor, due to the dependence of the Russian church on Tsargrad, had certain rights of leadership over Russia, as a protector of the Constantinople patriarch. This concept became widely known in the XIV century when Moscow dukes tried to achieve more independence for Russian (meaning Moscow) metropole. Then, in 1393, when the question regarding Moscow dukes interdiction to remember Byzantine king in churches arose Constantinople patriarch had to explain the following to Moscow dukes: the king is the tsar and autocrat (αὐτοχράτωρ) of Romeis (Byzantines) and all Christians, therefore, “it is impossible to have church and not to recognize over oneself the power of the tsar (Byzantine) as the imperial power and church have much in common, therefore they cannot be separated.”<sup>39</sup> M. Hrushevsky noted that in our corner of the world we do not know the real displays of these Byzantine sights, but we register them from the theoretical point of view.<sup>40</sup>

Later historiography analyzed one more aspect of the Byzantine missionary work. If one is to consider this mission not from the perspective of the people who have accepted Christianity from the Byzantium but not from the Empire position, then the most important question of Byzantine Greeks is formulated as follows: “Is it possible to turn a barbarian into a Christian?” Deep contempt for barbarians from Greek-Roman culture generated the ambivalent attitude of Byzantines towards missionary work. Therefore, the answer to the raised question for a Romej was most likely negative as even Christianity would never be able to transform a barbarian into a Christian.<sup>41</sup>

Reception of Byzantine law also turned out to be a controversial issue. As M. Hrushevsky wrote that it was the law of “society that was older, considerably more developed which in those days also served as a model for Russia, had been cultivated and codified for a long time and was presented in ready, written forms and, as a matter of fact, could give answers to new questions in society evolution.”<sup>42</sup> Moreover, this law had rather competent and influential propagandists, namely, the clergy who naturally praised Byzantine law as the law of Christian community in comparison with Russian law transferred by the pagan past. Thus, Byzantine law had the potential to influence Russian law, as well as its own specific sphere, specifically the church court that had certain influence over some social classes. It is logical to assume that consequently Byzantine law had to affect secular law and

legal practice, especially in the spheres close to church court, concerning mainly family law and inheritance.

It is important to underline that, in spite of such possibilities, the influence of Byzantine law on the Russian one was not very significant. This can be explained by a great difference in Byzantium and Rus' culture as well as the existence in Rus' of "deeply rooted" and different legal views. It is especially noticeable in the system of punishments. Rus' did not know corporal punishments; on the contrary, they were widespread in Byzantium. M. Hrushevsky noted that through the church sphere similar punishments came to Rus' but could not take any roots there.<sup>43</sup>

In his comments to the main text M. Hrushevsky identified the problem that leads to the issue "influence – dialogue" in intercultural contacts. When speaking about certain similarities in Byzantine and Russian law, the historian says that one shall not forget about noticeable Slavinization of late Byzantium and possible influences of Slavic common law on Byzantine law. Analogies with "Ruskaya Pravda" ("Russian Truth") are found in the latest Byzantine codes – *Ecklog*<sup>44</sup> and *Prokhiron*<sup>45</sup> based on new common law, such as *leges barbarorum*, and not just old Roman law. Therefore, in each separate case one shall study the norms thoroughly as one can observe the real influence of these codes or analogy of Russian law with Slavic common law of Byzantium.<sup>46</sup>

"Byzantine factor" continued to excite Ukrainian historians throughout the whole XX century. It is also connected with the old problem in its new interpretation, specifically, the problem of "East-West". N. Yakovenko notices that physical geography does not coincide with "the geography of representations" in respect of the basic co-ordinates East-West, North-South.<sup>47</sup> The most inconsistent in the Ukrainian discourse is the concept of the East. Penetration of Byzantine civilization into Podniester is believed to be the influence of the Byzantine East though in its geographical location towards Kiev Byzantium was not in the east, but in the south. It is obvious that this spatial orientation shows the transferring of the vision of Church split into Western (Latin) and Eastern (Byzantine). However, "an average Ukrainian" today still has a chimerical image of the East which combines the incompatible – Eastern Christian (Byzantine, and in a wider sense Mediterranean) civilization, Tjurk-Muslim culture of the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean khanate and "really" steppe East of nomadic hordes. This context also includes exotic culture of Russia in its ancient (Moscow) hypostasis.

N. Yakovenko believes that the situation was made even more complicated by Vyacheslav Lipinsky's metaphor who already in the 1920s defined the cultural space of Ukraine as the space "between the East and the West", i.e. between Eastern (Greek-Byzantine) and Western (European-Latin) civilizations. In 1923 Lipinsky wrote that the joining of the East and the West "is the essence of Ukraine, its soul, given its historical calling, a symbol and a sign of its national identity on its birthday by God."<sup>48</sup> Similar evaluations can serve as an answer to the theses of another Ukrainian author, geographer and publicist Stepan Rudnitsky who presented Ukraine as a "suburb" phenomenon simultaneously both of Europe and Asia, believing it to be the space where they flew into each other. This

“suburbanness” consists of the geographical placing of Ukraine at the crossroads of three worlds – European, Oriental-Islamic and nomadic Asian. This circumstance transforms Ukraine from “the border country” into “the country of borders”.<sup>49</sup>

Contrary to this “polyborderness” V. Lipinsky defined cultural-civilization space of Ukraine from a binary point of view. According to V. Lipinsky, the dual image of Ukraine lies in history itself starting with the hesitations between Rome and Byzantium when selecting a Christian ceremony and finishing with different directions of political and cultural aspirations towards Poland and Moscow representing “two different cultures, attitudes, concepts and civilisations”<sup>50</sup>. This multidirectedness is the integral line of the Ukrainian nation’s existence; therefore, a successful national life requires not the mourning of “fatal geography” and mutual rivalry of two opposite beginnings, but the search for ways of their harmonization and aspiration to unite these different territorial parts of Ukraine into “one national-political and spiritual integrity”<sup>51</sup>. In his later treatise “Letters to Brothers-Grain Growers” among the reasons for Ukraine’s non-stateness Lipinsky identifies Ukraine’s geographical position as being “on the way between Asia and Europe, ... in the geographically unstable border zone of two different cultures: Byzantine and Roman” as reason number one<sup>52</sup>. As we can see, V. Lipinsky, nevertheless, identifies “Byzantine” and “Asian”.

Both political and intellectual environment of the first quarter of the XX century encouraged almost simultaneous emergence of rather controversial works of these well-known Ukrainian researchers<sup>53</sup>. Intellectuals of Eastern Europe believed “West” and “East” to be the main antagonists of European history. In 1918 Russian thinker Nikolay Berdjajev wrote about the connection between East and West as the main theme of world history which Europe had to face<sup>54</sup>.

It is possible to say that “borderness” ideas of Ukrainian researchers expressed between the two World wars were developed though in a changed form by one of the most influential intellectuals of emigratory Ukrainian studies in the 1960-1970s Ivan Lysjak-Rudnitsky. In his report at Slavyansk historical congress in memory of Saints Cyril and Methodius (1963) “Ukraine between East and West”, I. Lysjak-Rudnitsky defined Ukraine as a classical region of “Union traditions” because social and political structures of the European type are combined here with Eastern Christian (Byzantine) ethnos. However, it makes it possible to see a considerable modification in the traditional opinions of Ukrainian researchers in the 1920-1930s. I. Lysjak-Rudnitsky writes that “Eurasian Orient” represents a bigger threat for Ukraine than “Byzantine Orient”<sup>55</sup>. There are also some racial notions about the introduction of “anarchiness” into the Ukrainian character by Turkic elements behind “Eurasian Orient”<sup>56</sup>.

However, if one is to dismiss the Euro-centered axes East-West and to look beyond Ukraine’s horizons then one shall discover that the system of spatial co-ordinates becomes more complicated. First of all, as N. Yakovenko writes it is because “little will be left from the Byzantine East”<sup>57</sup>. Having won back its historical role in the XV century, just when the Ukrainian people began to separate from “amorphous Rus” the East in Ukrainian history turns into three independent geocultural directions: the Neobyzantine North (Moscow),

the stable and developed Muslim South (Bakhchisarai and Istanbul) and the “present” East, to be exact – Great Steppe which was approaching Ukraine with the so-called Wild field of Priazovye and future Slobozhanshchina. Each of them somehow affected the formation of Ukraine’s new shape in the XV–XVIII centuries, i.e. during the epoch which laid the foundation for new Ukrainian history.

One can notice that every ethnos has its own West and East, North and South. However, this fact does not play the defining role in the formation of ethnic specificity for each ethnos. According to Yaroslav Dashkevich's concept, Ukraine’s territory can be referred to the so-called big border, namely a cultural border zone between groups of civilizations<sup>58</sup>.

N. Yakovenko notes that before foreign Ukrainian studies could overcome an “Anti-turkic” syndrome, there had to be an alternation of generations and modification of views about history in general<sup>59</sup>. To a great extent it was promoted by a new wave of Oriental studies. However, in the 1980-1990s foreign Ukrainian studies specialists seriously reconsidered the “West” concept in its reference to Ukrainian history. From indistinct “West in general” researchers moved to the problem of transmitting the European cultural tradition into Ukraine through the intermediation of Poland in models of political culture, types of formation, intellectual priorities, and religious positions<sup>60</sup>. Igor Shevchenko expressed this reevaluation in the most concentrated form, “If one is to look at things from the point of view of Eastern Europe then one shall face a paradox according to which without Byzantium there would be neither Ukraine, nor Belarus, but on the other hand, there would be neither Ukraine, nor Belarus without Poland”<sup>61</sup>.

What shall one do then with the understanding of “East” as there were three “historiographic Easts” for Ukraine: Byzantium, Russia, and the Turkic world. In Ukraine’s history all these “Easts” were not only mixed up among themselves also included “West” *nuances*. N. Yakovenko is ready with the following example: the “Western” model of values dominated in school and in intellectual and political culture of the Ukrainian elite of the XVI–XVII centuries; the soteriological (the salvation doctrine) aspect of thinking tenaciously preserved the Byzantine matrix, while the knightly subculture of that same elite had obvious signs of Turkic tradition. Even more expressively this steppe Orient was fixed in the genotype, priorities of life styles, types of management, the household standard of “beautiful”, clothes, toponimies and anthroponimies<sup>62</sup>. In this sense Ukraine’s Ukraine due to its geographical location at the junction of Eurasian Steppe and two bodies of the European culture (“Byzantine” and “Latin”) is really the crossroads between Asia, orthodox Europe and Latin Europe. The outlined intertwining of western and eastern civilization filled the Ukrainian culture with such a rich polyphony that sometimes it is almost impossible to distinguish its “own” from the acquired ones.

***In Search of Harmony:  
Newest Moldavian Historiography and Problem of Byzantine Heritage***

Modern Moldavian historiography, as well as the elite of the Republic of Moldova had to face the problem of the substantiation of the state's historical legitimacy, and, accordingly, the construction of historiographic continuity between Moldavian hospodariate of the XIV–XVI centuries and the modern Republic of Moldova.

Themes of Rome and Byzantium occupy a special place in the Moldavian historiography since they are connected with the ethnocultural and ethnolanguage origin of the Eastern-Roman people. In 106 Dacia was conquered by Roman emperor Trajan and turned into a Roman province. The urbanization of Trajan Dacia, the formation of city community (municipalities), the introduction of slaveholding, the rooting of Roman traditions and the Latin language, and, in general, of the Roman way of life, the inclusion of a new province into the general Roman economic and spiritual system could be recognized as Romanization components<sup>63</sup>. Romanization was the historical process during the course of which Roman civilization penetrated into all spheres of province's life and finally led to the replacement of the language of the indigenous population with the Latin language or, more precisely, with the local versions of Latin. The formation of the Rumanian ethnos occurred as a result of mix of Dacians and Roman colonists. Rumanians and Moldavians make the two most Eastern Roman peoples with the common literary language, namely Romanian.

The Roman conquering of Dacians was accompanied by the terror of wartime which was "the original act of birth of the Rumanian people". In turn, as Vasil Stati states, the population of the Carpathian-Dniester lands, especially those people who lived between the Prut and Dniester, did not participate in this "original birth act". Geto-Dacian tribes which were not part of the Roman province Moesia (to the south of the Danube) and of Dacia (the southwest of Transylvania) and which in the I–II century AD continued to live on their own territories, were given the name "Dacia liberi" or "free Dacians" by modern Rumanian historiography. "Ancestors ... of Moldavians, free Dacians, were not in Roman chains"<sup>64</sup>. This is the pathos of modern Moldavian historiography.

Moldova's territory even though it was not part of Dacia province, nevertheless, throughout the II–IV centuries experienced strong Roman influence. When Romans left Dacia provinces during the reign of Emperor Aurelian the basic centre of Romanization to the north of the Danube was Roman and Romanized population of the former Trajan Dacia. Liquidation of the recent border which separated the inhabitants of Roman province and free Dacians of Carpathian-Dniester area, created additional conditions for the spreading of Romanization on the whole territory of the former "free Dacia". Free Dacians were in constant contact with fellow tribesmen and gradually their counteraction to the Romanization process weakened considerably; later they adopted the language and more developed culture of the Romanized population of the former Trajan Dacia<sup>65</sup>.

The division of the Eastern Roman world is directly connected with the split of the Roman Empire into Western and Eastern and the process of Great resettlement of the

peoples<sup>66</sup>; consequently, already in the VI century AD there seems to have been the bases for separate existence of future Moldova. In the VI century Slavs started settling on the territory of Moldova and in the IX century Slavic Ulich and Tiverian tribes began occupying the interfluvial territory of the Prut and Dniester. Thus, in the X century these lands were included into the sphere of influence of Kievan Rus'. However, the invasion of Cumans (Polovtsy) and Padzinaks (Pechenegs) had led to the disappearance of the Slavic population by the end of the XII century. Moldavian historians, supporters of Romaniaism, note the Byzantine influence on the Eastern Roman population already during the epoch of "rudimentary state formations of Rumanians". Penetration into the region to the north of the Danube of the Cyrillic writing and liturgy in the Slavic language was also accompanied by "the adoption of some Byzantine elements in the organization of state institutions, including "domini" ("reigning") following the example of Greek "basileis" and Bulgarian "tsars"<sup>67</sup>. Thus, while the local medieval states were created, along with the "autochthonous" tradition of "National Rumanians", a great role was also played by both Byzantine-Southern Slavic influence, and the presence of the "Altay" migrating tribes. In the XIII – the beginning of the XIV century the territory of Moldova was under the power of Mongols.

The medieval Moldavian state emerged in 1359 as a result of liberation from the Hungarian rule. The struggle for independence was headed by the future prince (in the terminology of that time "voivoda") Bogdan I (the Founder) who had been Voloshsky voivoda in Maramuresh and the vassal of the Hungarian king. Soon, as a result of the victorious campaign of the grand Lithuanian duke Algirdas and the battle of Blue Waters in 1362 the interfluvial territory of the Prut and Dniester was liberated from Tatars. The eastern frontier of the Moldavian principality was established on the river Dniester. The western border passed through the tops of the Carpathian Mountains, while the southern one went across the Black Sea and the rivers Danube, Siret and Milkov. There was no natural border in the north while Pokuttia was for a long time a disputable area leading to numerous wars between Moldova and Poland. The modern Republic of Moldova occupies the middle part of the Eastern region of historical Moldova.

Because of numerous invasions and long absence of statehood Moldova up to the XIV century did not have its own church organization. The sacred rites were performed by priests coming from the adjacent Halitsky lands. After the foundation of the Moldavian principality a separate Moldavian metropole was formed as a part of the Patriarchy of Constantinople (for the first time it was mentioned in 1386)<sup>68</sup> at the end of the XIV century. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Moldavian church delegation led by metropolitan Damian participated in the ecumenical cathedral of Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Florence in 1439 which made the decision to unite both churches (Florentine Union)<sup>69</sup>. However, the Union was rejected by the majority of the orthodox states.

When describing the process of Moldova's formation of state institutions in the XIV century Victor Stepanjuk underlines the fact that at the initial stage it had a trace of old traditions<sup>70</sup>. Further, the Moldavian author refers to modern Roumanian researchers who believe that "such institutional structures as a hospodariate, high court services, and also the

relations between boyars and their hospodar (“lord”) during that period reflected features of the rule in the Byzantine empire<sup>71</sup>. However, when one looks at all these comparisons it becomes easy to see that the essence of the state system is described too generally, “Like the Byzantine emperors-autocrats the hospodar of Moldova disposed of life and death of the citizens whether it is a peasant, a small or big boyar”<sup>72</sup>.

Moldavian historians believe that hospodars of Moldova, continuing the Byzantine tradition, “adapted to new geographical, national, religious and cultural realities”<sup>73</sup>, considered themselves to be the proprietors of the country’s whole space and were its Supreme owners<sup>74</sup>. The argument in favor for this statement can be found in the presence in the Moldavian hospodars’ title of the adjective “autocratic” which appears already in the charter of Roman I on November, 18th, 1393: “The great autocratic master of the Moldavian land from the valley to the seacoast”. It is interesting that the concept “autocratic/autocrat” allows Moldavian historians to appeal to some parallels in Russia’s history. However, V. Stepanjuk believes that autocracy idea was developed in Russia one century later than in Moldova. Parallels with Russian history amplify when Moldavian political realities of the end of the XIV century are explained on the basis of the Moscow ideological practice of the XVIth century: the titles of Moldavian hospodars Peter I Mushat (1392) and Roman I (1393) containing the words “autocratic master” have what the historian of Russian church A. Kartashev defined as “the copy of the title of Byzantine basileis and the term specific to Russian people, expressing the pleasure of full liberation from the Tatar bondage”; the autocrat meant “absolutely unbound, free from any citizenship, independent”<sup>75</sup>. Besides, the origin of autocratic ideology seems to be foreign, namely Byzantine and Southern Slavic<sup>76</sup>. Moreover, Voloshk and Moldavian law contain some borrowings from Byzantine law. These law norms of Moldova pursued the goal “to moderate the tendencies of an encroachment of large nobility on the prerogatives of the hospodar and also to resist the attempts of the latter to liquidate the nobility privileges reflecting the sociopolitical opposition which is characteristic for all history periods of the Moldavian State”<sup>77</sup>.

In the decades which followed the creation of the Moldavian principedom, its own interstate institutions were created and perfected: political, administrative, judicial, religious. The basis for the creation of Moldova’s political establishments was formed by the original alloy of traditions of managing the local rural community according to “the custom of the land” with the Byzantine, Southern Slavic, Central and Western European traditions, thus representing. The synthesis from which original political structures of Romanian principedoms subsequently crystallized<sup>78</sup>. Legal proceedings contained the practice of reference to written laws of the Byzantine origin, for instance, to “Legalist” (“Syntagma”) by Matvej Vlastares the copy of which was made in Moldova in 1472.<sup>79</sup>

In turn, medieval Moldova seems to have become a retransmitter of Byzantine political concepts to Moscow, thereupon, the rooting of autocratic ideology in Russia is connected with the crowning that took place February, 4th, 1498. It was the Moscow crowning of Dmitry, the son of Elena Voloshanka, the daughter of Stefan III the Great, and the



grandson of great Moscow prince Ivan III. It was “the first Moscow crowning which was later repeated and became a custom only during the reign of Ivan the Terrible”<sup>80</sup>.

### ***Idea of Symphony***

One more aspect of the Byzantine influence is found by Moldavian historians in the sphere of state and church interaction. “Joint actions of the Moldavian State and Metropole of Moldova, mutual support of efforts of Moldova hospodar and Moldova metropolitan regarding the preservation of country’s independence and protection of its citizens”<sup>81</sup> reminds of the “*idea of symphony* [underlined by us – O.D.] in mutual relations between Church and State, formed in Byzantium”<sup>82</sup>, from where it moved to Moldova. V. Stepanjuk supports the concept of ideal functioning of similar “division of power” designs referring to the opinion of Russian historiography: “The church took care of divine affairs while the state dealt with terrestrial matters; however, the state should look after the church, care about the preservation of the doctrine and “honor of priesthood”. The priesthood together with the state “directs all public life to follow the directions approved by God”<sup>83</sup>.

In early Byzantium one of the fundamental ideas of medieval ideology – the idea of the union of Christian Church and Christian Empire – gradually crystallized. Theorists of Christianity believed that the essential condition for this union was the orthodoxy of Christian Church and the Emperor. Since the time of emperor Constantine I Christian concept of the imperial power gradually merges with the Roman theory of the state. Theoretical foundation of the political theory *of symphony* that dominated for a long time, specifically, harmonious relations between Orthodox Church and the Christian Emperor was developed in early Byzantium. The idea of the Byzantium Empire’s Christian providential election is connected with the Byzantium Empire. The cult of the emperor as the governor of the whole Orthodox populated universe and the cult of the Romei Empire as the defender and patroness of Christian peoples, born in early Byzantium, will be consistently strengthened over the next centuries of the empire’s existence. The imperial ideology and glorification of the imperial power are the most characteristic features of Byzantium’s public life distinguishing it from the countries of Western Europe<sup>84</sup>. The political theory of Byzantines, their views on the state and the emperor powers strongly influenced the formation of concepts of the supreme power in the countries of Southeastern and the Eastern Europe<sup>85</sup>.

Western church was the carrier of the universalism idea that led to the creation of the centralized hierarchical church organization headed by a theocratic sovereign, namely, the Pope. The papacy did not obey the secular power and conducted its independent policy. In Byzantium, on the contrary, the secular state itself personified a Universalist idea and was at the head of the whole Christian populated universe. Byzantium’s spiritual power was limited by the secular power through the widespread theory of Caesar-papism, i.e. full domination of the state over the church popular at some point in time but rejected in modern Byzantium studies<sup>86</sup>.

Gilbert Dagron believes that if one wants to understand what “Caesar-papism” means it is necessary to compare and oppose this indistinct term to another one, a much more accurate term “theocracy”<sup>87</sup>. Society can be called theocratic if it is operated by and watched over by God<sup>88</sup> showing, directly or indirectly, God’s will in everything. Already in the XVII century sociologists (Thomas Gobbs, Benedict Spinoso) identified a number of differences between several kinds of the political organization based on revelation and closely connected with religion: in some cases priests are content with giving legitimacy to the worldly power (“hierocracy”), in others the high priest or the head of the community possesses the supreme power believing that it is due to the fact of their holding a certain position (theocracy in the true sense of the word), in some other cases the secular power to a greater or lesser extent dominates the religious sphere (forms of Caesar-papism). This division is used to oppose theocracy and Caesar-papism, the model of the priest-caesar and the model of the caesar-priest. Later the term “Caesar-papism” began to be used widely to stigmatize every “secular” sovereign laying claim to become the Pope. Though the term has a sociological character it was used with obvious polemic pathos, within the framework of the general classification opposing theocratic or Caesar-papist east to West where the independence of “two powers” was perceived as a dogma. Justus Henning Bohmer (1674–1749), the professor of university in Halle, in his textbook on church Protestant law devoted the whole passage to two main kinds of power abuse in the religious sphere: “Papo-Caesaria” and “Caesaro-Papia”. He used this method to speak on behalf of the Reformed church to equally expose the Pope who had appropriated the political power, and the secular governors, dealing with religious problems the way it had already been done by emperor Justinian. From two members of this opposition, only the second term was a success: it was often used in the second half of the XIX century, though not so much as a theoretical concept, but to sting Byzantium and its orthodox successors implying that the “schism” between the Christian East and the Christian West was the fault of “Constantine” or “Justinian” intervention in religious affairs. Such an approach transformed the difference between the secular and spiritual power into their full incompatibility.

In the XIX century the term “caesar-papism” was actively spread by Catholic theologians and historians (German scientist I. Hergenreter, etc.). Reformist Russian Orthodoxy also participated in this process. In the last decades of the XIX century Vladimir Solovjev discredited imperial absolutism and its statements that Eastern Church “itself refused the rights” to hand them over to the state. He especially blamed Orthodox Church for having become “national church” that, therefore, lost the right to represent Christ who possessed all power on the earth and in the sky.

Byzantium was once again criticized because while it was pretending to be the center of universal Church, it actually initiated the turn towards nationalism. “Byzantine harm” consisted of the absence of clear distinction between the spiritual and the secular, of the priority of interests of the latter over the former and in the acceptance by Caesar upon himself the responsibility for divine affairs. In this respect Russia is described as “provincialized and barbarized Byzantium”.

In reply to these numerous reproaches “Easterners” whose belief and whose concern for the truth had been called into question tried to show resistance. They introduced essential corrections into this black picture of retrograde “Byzantianism” and showed that “caesar-papism” was an anachronism incorrectly projecting the Western concept of papacy onto the East. Byzantium never denied the distinctions existing between the secular and the spiritual, it never officially allowed for the emperor to be the priest: those autocrats who risked offering something of the kind this were considered heretics and those who encroached on church rights (or, that is even worse, on church riches), were called church robbers. Besides, the interventions of the Empire into Church affairs should not be unduly generalized – some of them were admissible (the right of the emperor to convoke and preside over Cathedrals; promulgation of laws and canons; support and modification of church hierarchy), others were worthy condemnation (appointment of bishops; formulation of faith symbol).

Interaction of the Moldavian state and church illustrates the principle of appointment of Suceava metropolitans for Moldavian historians. Until the 80s of the XIV century Constantinople patriarchs sent priests from the neighboring states which were not under the power of the Moldavian prince to Moldova. In 1387 hospodar Petru Mushat made Joseph the metropolitan of the Moldavian church (Suceava metropoly). This step led to a conflict with the patriarchy of Constantinople which had sent metropolitan Eremija to Moldova. When Eremija was exiled from the country, the patriarch threatened hospodar and boyars with an anathema. Only in 1401 prince Alexander Dobryj (Alexandru chel Bun) managed to settle the dispute. Henceforth, he could choose the metropolitan, but the patriarch had then to confirm the choice. The metropolitan became the second person in the state and the first adviser to hospodar<sup>89</sup>.

Last decades of the XVI century see the penetration of the Moldavian (Romanian) language into the hospodar official documents. In the first decades of the XVII century this process completely rooted itself. But the native language of the Moldovan people made its way into the official office-work, culture and science in the conditions of mass emergence of Greek Church books and canons during the same time period. The process of penetration of Greek culture and Greek elements was supported by traders and Greek dignitaries-fanorits who also became hospodars<sup>90</sup>. However, this process was not the consequence of actually Postbyzantine influence on the Moldavian culture, but rather the strengthening of the Turkish control over the state life of Moldova. Not trusting the local elite, the Turkish court decided to operate Moldova through its devoted servants of the Greek origin, natives of the Istanbul quarter Fener. Gradually Greeks-fanorits began to occupy high hierarchical positions of Orthodox Church in Moldova, so by the end of the XVIII century the metropoly of Moldova had become some kind of the Greek episcopacy subordinated to other political structures<sup>91</sup>. This example clearly shows that for Moldavian history and historiography the Greek presence and the Byzantine influence are two different notions.

### ***Stefan III as New Constantin***

Besides its own vision of the problem of the relation between the state and the church, Moldavian historiography also offers its understanding of the theme "East-West". V. Stati believes that "due to fate located on the brink of the Catholic world, having in the South the Slavic people of the orthodox-Byzantine belief, Moldova managed to use fruitfully the historiographic models created by other peoples"<sup>92</sup>. The Moldavian historiography of the late Middle Ages had "a Slavic frame" and creatively modified written historical models of the southern Slavic countries, namely, Bulgaria and Serbia which, in turn, used the Byzantine matrixes. Thus, the written Moldavian culture of the times of Stefan III the Great (Ștefan cel Mare / Stefan chel Mare) (1457–1504), "keeping his Moldavian content and essence in the Slavic-Byzantine form, continued the cultural, but not ideological continuity with the Slavic world"<sup>93</sup>. This duration of "the cultural continuity" with the Slavic world is the defining feature of the Moldavian spirituality.

One of the most ancient monuments of the wall painting which has remained since the times of Stefan III is the frescos of churches Petreuts (1487), Sacred Ilia (1488) and Voronets (1488). Their remarkable peculiarity is the presence of iconographic themes whose ideological content is the direct allusion to the problems of big political urgency which Moldova's society was concerned about in the XV century. The western wall of the Petreuts pronaos contains the painting of Byzantine emperor Constantine on a horse, directing a cavalcade of sacred soldiers led by George and Dmitry. Ahead of the emperor there is Archangel Michael ordering heavenly armies and showing to Constantine a white cross in the sky. Such an iconographic method is used to represent the legend "Constantan's Life", narrating the story about the emperor who is going into the battle to protect Christianity<sup>94</sup>. Moldavian historians found it important to interpret in such a way the meaning of this composition offered by French historian of art Andre Grabar (*L'origine des facades peintes des eglises moldaves*. 1933). One cannot find a similar plot in the painting in other orthodox countries.

Stefan III devoted Petreuts church to the Great Sacred Cross, and Moldavian historians do not find this gesture accidental. "Was not a well-known voivoda the apostle of the struggle against infidel Turks, the first prince in Eastern Europe who, after the falling of the Byzantine Empire, wished to transform a traditional defensive war into a Christian expedition against Islam?" When listing the attempts of Stefan III to unite forces of the neighboring states against Osmons and reminding about the victory of the Moldavian army over Turks and Vlachs in 1475, researchers directly connect the Cavalcade scene in Petreuts church with the ideological program of Moldavian hospodar, "In this church devoted to the Sacred Cross, the procession of sacred taxiarkhoses (military chiefs) under the sign of the Christian victory acquires a certain obvious allegorical sense. As once emperor Constantine entered the struggle against pagans and destroyed them so Stefan the Great Moldavian, new Constantine, would defeat the infidel enemy of the Sacred Cross". Similar representations of the Cavalcade were also later used in the Moldavian wall painting with

the same Christian meaning<sup>95</sup>. In general, the state of Stefan the Great is Moldavian “Eden” for modern Moldavian historiography of different directions<sup>96</sup>.

During the times of hospodariate of Petru Rares (1527–1538, 1541–1546) a whole program of the exterior wall paintings of the Moldavian churches was realized: Probota (1532), Sacred George in Suceava (1534), Khumor (1535), Baja (1535–1538), Moldovitsa (1537), Belinesht’ (1535–1538), Arbure (1541), Voronets (1547)<sup>97</sup>. The basic plots of these iconographic monuments are very similar in many respects. The plot of “Siege of Constantinople” is especially unique. The center of the painting is the reinforced city besieged from the sea and land by the enemy. One of the inscriptions informs that it is the Persian siege of Constantinople of 626. However, the besiegers are dressed in Turkish clothes, and the defenders of the city and their enemies use artillery. Modern Moldavian historians wonder, “Why did Moldavian painters change the Greek sample and replace Persians with Turks and introduce the artillery unknown in 626?” The majority of researchers assume that the Moldavian frescos represent the Turkish siege in 1453. However, it seems possible that the then spiritual and secular authorities of Moldova could not allow to represent the catastrophe of the Christian world on the facades of orthodox churches. Hence, the painting describes the Persian siege of 626 when the divine assistance of the Virgin Mary helped to beat off the pagans. But what shall one think about the artillery and Turks? By using the guns and Turks the painters of Petru Raresha adapted the “Siege” theme to the realities of the country, having transformed it into a demonstrative national appeal: “As once the Virgin Mary helped Byzantines to defeat besieging Persians, let her today help Moldavians to defeat Turkish aggressors”. Thus, the composition has got a dual meaning: on the one hand, it represents Constantinople, while on the other hand it represents the orthodox country of Moldova.

For modern Moldavian historians the correctness of such understanding of the scene “Siege” is also supported by the fact that the painter (Khumor, 1535) added a new element, namely, a horseman who managed to get out of the besieged city and was promptly attacking the enemy’s cavalry leader with a pike. A small inscription over the horseman’s head gives the character’s name – Toma. It is believed that it was exactly the painter of the church whose original horse image was the first self-portrait in Moldavian art. This conclusion is confirmed by the letter sent in 1541 to Suceava by a certain “Toma, zograph from Suceava, courtier of glorified and great Moldavian hospodar Peter-Voivoda”. Thus, one comes to the conclusion that the author of this letter is the painter of the church in Khumor. The fact that the painter of Petru Raresha epoch managed to represent himself as the defender of the besieged fortress clearly testifies that for Moldavians of those years the “Siege” theme showed not only the image of victorious Constantinople, but also the symbol of Suceava and, in a broader sense, of victorious Moldova. A Moldavian Toma from Suceava defends not the Byzantine capital but protects his own country<sup>98</sup>.

The reigning of Stefan the Great is seen in Moldova and Rumania as the nicest period in the medieval history of the Moldavian (Rumanian) people and a struggle culmination for independence and self-affirmation in the general context of the Western civilization of

the XV century. "Having managed to establish social balance in the country, hospodar put an end to intestine wars of boyar groupings and created a public base for the strengthening of the duke power which united under its sceptre stately nobility (boyars), military nobility ..., peasants-civil guardsmen, and townspeople"<sup>99</sup>. In this sense the evaluation of activities of Stefan the Great has something in common with the vision of the role of the Byzantine emperors who towered over all empire estates and were a unifying, central element of the state-political system of Byzantium.

In 1992 in the monastery Putna where Stefan III was buried his canonization by Orthodox Church as a saint took place. The year of 2004 being the year of the 500 anniversary of hospodar's death was declared by the president of Moldova Vladimir Voronin the year of Stefan the Great and Sacred (Saint).

For the last one and a half decade the defining role in the construction of the concept of the national state in Moldova was played by "Moldovanism" and "Roumanism" which defined two parallel identities. Frequently finding proof of the ideological postulates in the same historical sources, "Roumanism" and "Moldavanism", nevertheless, are characterized by conceptual differences. If "Roumanism" could be defined as ethnocultural nationalism postulating ethnic and linguistic identity of Moldavians and Rumanians then "Moldovanism" eventually developed into civil nationalism legitimizing both the historical past of the independent Moldavian state and its future<sup>100</sup>.

Moldova's political polarization and ambiguity of possible solutions to the problems of the state territory consolidation are projected onto different currents of Moldavian historiography. The question of the Byzantine heritage, certainly, is not defining, but it allows to identify certain distinctions. This issue is most important for historians – "Moldovanists" who aspire to find the continuation of ancient civilization and cultural tradition in the Moldavian hospodariate and to stretch it to the Republic of Moldova. Historians – "Roumanists" find the Byzantine tradition to be of great value, though they are inclined to speak more about political and legal borrowings rather than about the continuity of the whole cultural complex. However, the historiography of the Dniester region is not really interested in the Byzantine theme.<sup>101</sup>

If the problem of the ethnocultural and ethnolanguage origin of Eastern Roumanians in Moldavian historiography is directly connected with the theme of the Roman presence in the Carpathian-Dniester region, Romanization of Geto-Dacians (northern Thracians) then the existence of the medieval Moldavian state is accompanied by the symbolics of Byzantium and the reference to its traditions. Unexpectedly, the substantiation of Moldova's "historical legitimacy" happens through the appeal to ideological and political practice of Russia of the XVI century, but only that part of it which mainly concerns the adoption of the Byzantine tradition. In this sense modern Moldavian historians find that their country appears to be a true successor of Byzantium as before other orthodox countries Moldova established the symphony principle in the country. So Moldavian consciousness and Moldavian historians of different political and cultural orientation are in this search of harmony with their own history

We can see now how important the Byzantine theme is for modern historiographies and historiosophies of Ukraine and Moldova. Byzantine symbols give to historians of the Border zone a possibility to substantiate their own statehood tradition. At the same time, this image of pride and uncertainty contains a strong cultural-religious component; it finds its strongest expression in the Ukrainian situation in the concept “Kiev as New Constantinople / [or] New Jerusalem”, while in the case with Moldova it is expressed in the idea of symphony idea. The question of a civilized choice maintains its topical importance for Ukrainian historiography and in a certain sense it remains an intellectual and psychological stimulus. Moldavian historians believe the Roman-Byzantine heritage to be the source of European identity of their people.

Meanwhile, Byzantine reminiscences of historiographies of the Border zone make up open concepts and do not serve as the basis for the strategy of self-isolation that we observe in the case with Russian historiosophic and politological practices. Thus, one can see a considerable modernization potential of the Byzantine heritage for the Ukrainian and Moldavian intellectual thought. The Byzantine factor for it is the way of discussion, doubts and cultural variety.

### **Notes**

- <sup>1</sup> Translation from the edition: Abzirlovich, I. *Advechnym shlyaham* (Dasledziny belaruskaga svetaglyadu) // *Vobraz – 90: Litaraturna-krytychnyja artykuly* / Ukl. S. Dubavets. Minsk, 1990. P. 44.
- <sup>2</sup> Abzirlovich, I. *Advechnym shlyaham*. P. 44.
- <sup>3</sup> Kabzińska I. *Człowiek na pograniczu kulturowym*//*Kwartalnik historii kultury materialnej*. Rok LIV, Nr. 3–4. Warszawa, 2006. P. 271.
- <sup>4</sup> Lotman, Yu. M. *Problema Vyzantijskogo vlijanija na Russkiju kulturu v tipologicheskom osheshchenii* / Yu.M. Lotman// *Vyzantija i Rus’ (pamyati Very Dmitrievny Likhachovoj. 1937–1981)* / sost. T.B.Knjazevskaja. M.: Nauka, 1989. P. 228.
- <sup>5</sup> Lotman, Yu. M. *Problema Vyzantijskogo vlijanija*. . . P. 232.
- <sup>6</sup> Lotman, Yu. M. *Semiosfeaa* / Yu. M. Lotman. SPb., 2000. P. 251.
- <sup>7</sup> Lotman, Yu. M. *Problema Vyzantijskogo vlijanija*. . . P. 229.
- <sup>8</sup> Kantor R. *The borderland as a national cultural area*//*Borderland. Culture. Identity*. Kraków, 1996. P. 29.
- <sup>9</sup> Simonides D. *Jednoś ć w różnorodności. Z problematyki kultury pogranicza*//*Pogranicza kulturowe i etniczne w Polsce*. Red. Z. Klodnicki, H. Rusek. Wrocław, 2003. P. 18–19.
- <sup>10</sup> *Pamyatniki literatury drevnej Rusi: XI – nachalo XII v. M.*, 1978. P. 26.
- <sup>11</sup> *Pamyatniki literatury drevnej Rusi*. P. 38.
- <sup>12</sup> In this sense D.S.Likhachyova’s remark is classical: *Kommentarii // Povest’ vremennyh let / Podg. teksta, perevod i statiji D.S.Lihachyova*. Pod red. V.P.Adrianovoj-Perets. 2 izd., ispr., i dop. SPb., 1996. P. 409. Among latest works: Nazarenko, A.V. *Byla li stolitsa v Drevnej Rusi? Nekotorye sravnitelno-istoricheskije i terminologicheskije nabljudenija* // *Stolichnye i periferijnye goroda Rusi i Rossii v srednije veka i ranneje novoje vremya (XI–XVIII vv.)*. M., 1996. P. 69–72; Visotsky, S.O. Kyiv: “Tse budi mati gradom russkim” (pro litopisnyj visliv to jogo tлумachen-

- nya //Istorija Rusi-Ukrainy (istoriko-arheologichny zbirnik). K, 1998. P. 99–103; Rusina O. Kyiv yak sancta civitas u moskovskoj ideologii ta politichnij praktitsi XIV–XVI st. // Rusina O. Studii z istorii Kyiva ta Kyivskoj zemli. K, 2005. P. 172.
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- <sup>42</sup> Hrushevsky, M. S. Istorija Ukrainy-Rusi. T. 3. P. 358.
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